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ABSTRACT
Although All-Optical Network (AON) are a viable technology for future telecommunication and data networks,
it creates many security vulnerabilities that do not exist in traditional networks. Transparency and non-
regeneration features make attack detection and localization diÆcult, because the eects of an attack connection
can propagate quickly to dierent parts of a transparent All-Optical Network. Among all attack types in AON,
crosstalk attack's propagation capability is second to none. Quick detection and localization of such attack
source can avoid losing large amounts of data in an All-Optical Network. However, to detect attack sources, it
is not necessary to put monitors on all nodes. Since those connections aected by the attack connection would
provide valuable information for diagnosis, we show that placing a relatively small number of monitors on a
selected set of nodes in a network is suÆcient to achieve the required level of performance. This paper introduces
crosstalk attack model and monitor-segment concept. After showing a necessary and suÆcient condition for
one-OAF diagnosable AON, a new sparse monitor placement method is proposed.
Keywords: Crosstalk, Attack, Monitor, AON.
1. INTRODUCTION
An All-Optical Network (AON) is a network where the user-network interface is optical and the data does not
undergo optical to electrical conversion within the network. AONs are attractive because they deliver very high
data rates, and support a broad class of applications. The ability to route large amounts of data and access
dierent channels makes an AON a very attractive option for providing very high-rate access in WANs, MANs,
and even LANs.
Although AONs are a viable technology for future telecommunication and data networks, their intrinsic
security dierences with existing electro-optic and electronic networks have received attention only recently.
Security in AONs is an important research area, and it is dierent from communication and computer security in
general. AONs introduce new physical layer mechanisms that may change potential models of attack from those
that are known for electronic networks. AONs are typically used to carry extremely high data rates. Moreover,
AONs' transparency characteristic means that data does not undergo optical-to-electrical or electrical-to-optical
conversion. Thus, connections in such networks are amplied, but may not be regenerated at intermediate
components. This transparency characteristic has many advantages in certain aspects, however, it also creates
many security vulnerabilities that do not exist in traditional networks. In a network with regeneration ability,
an anomalous connection will lose its attack capability after passing through an intermediary node, while in a
network without regeneration ability, a malicious connection can propagate from its primary source to other
nodes without losing its attack capability. Transparency and non-regeneration features make attack detection
and localization diÆcult.
The research reported in this paper is funded in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under
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1.1. Dierence between attack and failure
Generally, there are three main dierences between an attack and a failure:
1. attacks may spread to many users and many parts of the network, while a component failure only aects
those connections passing through it;
2. attacks attempt to avoid detection, while the failure cannot do that;
3. rerouting traÆc connections using a scheme to tolerate hardware failure cannot solve the problem caused by
an attack connection.
There are several kinds of attacks, including ber cuts (ber attack), power jamming (amplier attack),
crosstalk attack (switching node attack), and correlated jamming (tapping attack), etc. Some of these attacks,
such as ber cuts, can be treated as a component failure. Other attacks, like correlated jamming, can only
aect those connections that are sharing the same link or the same node with the attack connections.
Among all these attack methods, crosstalk attack has higher damage capabilities. The attacker injects
a malicious connection which has very high power energy, beyond expected value. When this connection
passes through a wavelength selective switch, the leakage energy (crosstalk) of this malicious connection can be
signicant and aect the normal connections passing through the same switch. Unlike other attacks, a crosstalk
attack can not only aect those connections sharing the same link or node with it, but also may induce attack
capabilities to those connections that are attacked.1 As shown in Figure 1(a), the crosstalk attack happens at
a wavelength switch and only aects those normal connections in the same wavelength. In this paper, we only
focus on the crosstalk attack with homowavelength assumption.









(a) Crosstalk attack in wavelength selective switch
Node i (a switch)




Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk
(Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk)
      Channel 3 + Crosstalk from 
Crosstalk from (Channel 2 + Channel 1 Crosstalk)
superimposed on Channel 3
Crosstalk from Channel 1 superimposed on Channel 2
(b) Crosstalk attack propagation
Figure 1. Example of crosstalk attack
1.2. Related work
There are many reasons why, in AONs, attacks must be detected and identied at all nodes in the network.
One reason is that the high data rate of AONs requires the attack detection as soon as possible. Another reason
is that a service disruption attack can spread throughout the network. There is some work1{4 in the area of
attack localization in AONs. These papers only considered networks in which all nodes had monitors. Other
methods, as proposed by,5{7 can provide probabilistic approaches to fault diagnosis in network. They are not
suitable for our attack localization problem. Because these approaches only give the most likely set instead of
determining the exact location of the source, we still need further steps to analyze where the exact location of
the source is.
The capability of an optical monitoring module is discussed in.8, 9 Generally, an optical monitor can
measure single channel optical power. It is doubtful that a monitor device will be less expensive in the near
future. Therefore, to install a monitor at each node in the network is likely very expensive.
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1.3. Feasibility of sparse monitor network
A network management system using supervisory channels, as proposed by,10, 11 can detect and monitor the
performance of network devices remotely. Thus, detecting attack sources is not necessarily equivalent to putting
monitors at all nodes. Because those connections aected by attack can provide valuable information about
distribution of attack locations, if we can monitor all connections in whole network, we may obtain the necessary
information needed for our diagnostic purpose. If normal connections can not provide suÆcient information,
we can derive the monitoring information from some test connections. From the previous research,12 we notice
that generally the number of idle wavelengths in a network is very large. For example, in a 4  4 mesh-torus
network, if the connection load of each source-destination pair is 0.3 and the number of wavelengths on each
link is 8, then the number of idle wavelengths on each link could be 5 with a probability of more than 70%. This
information is helpful in establishing a test connection. Moreover, existing connections can also be monitored
for malicious attacks. These two together allow us to create a capable diagnostic system. We believe and show
that this diagnostic information is suÆcient for localizing an attack connection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we propose a crosstalk attack and monitor model
based on some previous work.1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11 In next section, we introduce monitor-segment concept and the
necessary and suÆcient condition to localize one crosstalk attack in the whole network. After that, a new
sparse monitor placement method is given. Based on these policies, we prove that we can always localize
malicious homowavelength crosstalk attacks in the network with sparse monitors. In the following section, we
give a example to explain our algorithm and demonstrate their capabilities. Finally, we present our conclusions.
2. CROSSTALK ATTACK AND MONITOR MODEL
Before we explain our crosstalk attack detection and localization method based on sparse monitors, we describe
our models for the node, crosstalk attack, and monitor.
2.1. Node model
We assume that every node in our network has the following characteristics.
1. A node can perform routing and switching. Without the switching capability, a node cannot propagate a
crosstalk attack to other normal connections. In such a case, this node should not be considered as a potential
attack propagation node.
2. Some nodes can support monitoring capability as described in the following (monitor model part). We call a
node supporting monitoring capability as a monitor node and a node without this capability as a a non-monitor
node.
2.2. Crosstalk attack model
As shown in Figure 1(a), the crosstalk attack connection only aects the same wavelength connections at the
wavelength selective switches. The following items describe our crosstalk attack model.
1. Up-stream and down-stream neighbor nodes: For a certain node on a certain connection path, its up-stream
neighbor node (UNN) is the previous node on that path. Similarly, its down-stream neighbor node (DNN) is
the next node on that path. In the rest of this paper, UNN(node A; connection C) denotes the UNN of node
A on connection C. Similarly, DNN(node A; connection C) denotes the DNN of node A on connection C.
2. The original attack ow (OAF) has a much higher energy level than permitted on a normal connection. The
leakage of energy at a switch from the attack connection inuences all other normal connections using the same
wavelength on other bers. The ability of an OAF to inuence normal connections is same on its path.
3. A normal connection sharing a same nodes with the OAF will be aected, and this connection will be called
as a secondary attacked ow (SAF). The SAF has limited attack capability. That is, if a normal connection C
gets aected by an OAF at node u, then the connection C has attack capability only at node DNN(u;C).
4. A normal connection inuenced by an SAF is called a nal attacked ow (FAF). The FAF does not have the
attack propagation capability.
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5. A connection not aected by either OAF or SAF is called an attack-free ow (AFF). Similarly, a node that
is neither a PAN nor a SAN is called an attack-free node (AFN). The union of AFF, SAF, and FAF is called
an innocent ow (IF) set.
As shown in Figure 1(b) , connection 1 is the OAF, connection 2 is the SAF, and connection 3 is the FAF.
2.3. Monitor Node Model
We call a node equipped with a monitor device as a monitor node, or a monitor. A node without a monitor
device is called a non-monitor node.
1. A monitor node can monitor all traÆc passing through it, including the traÆc that originated/terminated
at the node.
2. The monitor node can detect the input/output connection power in all parts including its demultiplexer,
multiplexer, switch plane, etc. to see if any power level is beyond the expected value. If a connection
passes through a monitor with very high power, then we say that this connection is in attack-status at
that monitor. A connection can be in an attack/non-attack status at a monitor. We use A/ A to indicate
the attack/non-attack status of the connection.
3. If there are at least two connections which have attack capabilities passing through a same monitor, then
there are two possibilities.
(a) One connection is an OAF while all the others are SAFs. Because P (OAF ) > P (SAF ), the monitor
node can detect that one connection has higher power than others do, and the monitor considers
only this connection (OAF) to have attack capability. Thus, only OAF will be set A, while other
SAFs will be set A.
(b) All these connections are SAFs. In this situation, the monitor can detect several connections which
have the similar unexpected high power, then the monitor set all these connections to A.
3. MONITOR-SEGMENT AND NECESSARY & SUFFICIENT CONDITION
For a given graph G(V;E), let M denote the set of monitor nodes, and let N denote the set of non-monitor
nodes, M  V , N  V , and M
S
N = V .
On this graph G(V;E), some connections are established. Let C = R
S
T denote the set of connections in
the network, where R is the regular set of connections, and T is the set of test connections.
Let ci be a connection consisting of node fu0; u1; u2; : : : ; uk; : : :g. Let U(ci) denote the set of nodes on
connection ci's path. Then, cij denotes an one-hop segment (uj ! uj+1) on connection ci.
3.1. Monitor-Segment
A monitor-segment mscij is a one-hop segment cij when node uj+1 is a monitor. Let MSC denote the set
of the monitor-segments. Let mscij denote this particular monitor segment. Mostly, we use msc to denote a
common monitor segment. Two monitor segments are shown in Figure 2, one is made by connection c2 and
monitor node m1, denoted by m1c2, while the other is made by one-hop segment on connection c1, from node
2 to node m2, and monitor node m2, denoted by m2c1.
A monitor segment msc = (u! m) is monitoring a connection c if:
1. this monitor segment msc = (u! m) is a part of connection c, or
2. this monitor segment msc = (u! m) shares and only shares node u with c, u 2 U(c) and m =2 U(c).
For example, in Figure 2, according to our denition, both monitor segments m1c2 and m2c1 are monitoring
connection c1, and none of them is monitoring connection c3. Let (msc; c) denote this relation between monitor-
segment msc and connection c. Consequently, the status of the segment (u ! m) indicated by monitor m is
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C 2 Monitor Segments
Figure 2. Monitor-Segment Example
the status of the monitor-segment, denoted by S(msc). For example, in Figure 2, if the status of c2 in monitor
m1 is indicated as A, then the status of the monitor-segment m1c2 is A. S(msc) can be either A or A.
The status of a connection can be either IF or uncertain. IF means that the connection is determined as
IF, and uncertain means that the connection cannot be determined neither as IF nor as OAF. Let S(c) denote
the status of connection c. Table 1 shows the relations between a monitor-segment status and its monitoring
connection's status.
Table 1. Truth Table for monitor-segment and its monitoring/non-monitoring connections
Relation S(msc) S(c)
msc monitoring c A uncertain
(msc; c) A IF
msc non-monitoring c A IF
A uncertain
For a connection c, which is not being monitoring by msc, we say that msc has non monitoring relation
with c. Table 1 shows the relations between a monitor-segment and its non-monitoring connection.
In,13 two monitor-segment properties are described:
Property I: if a monitor m is the source of connection c, then monitor m and connection c builds a special
monitor-segment msc, and only connection c is monitored by this monitor-segment, while all other connections
are not monitored. If S(msc) = A, all other connections can be identied as IF .
Property II: if a monitor segment msc = (u ! m) shares both nodes, u and m, with a connection c, where
(u ! m) =2 c, and u;m 2 U(c), then the relation between connection c and the monitor-segment msc is
non-monitoring.
We can transfer graph G(V;E), as shown in Figure 3(1), into a bipartite graph G0(V 0; E0), as shown in
Figure 3(2). In graph G0(V 0; E0), the vertices set V 0 = fmcig
S
fCkg consists of the monitor-segments and
the connection. For example, 3c3 is a monitor-segment made up by monitor node 3 and one-hop segment
(4 ! 3) 2 c3. An edge in G
0 depicts a relation between a monitor segment and a connection. In this gure,
a directed edge from a monitor-segment msc to a connection c describes the monitoring relation between this
pair of monitor-segment and connection, and (msc; c) denotes the edge. Let  (msci) = fcj j(msci; cj) 2 E
0g
denote the set of connections monitored by a monitor-segment msci, and let  
 1(ci) = fmscj j(mscj ; ci) 2 E
0g
denote the set of monitor-segments monitoring a connection ci.
A connection is called UnIdentified if we cannot obtain the status of the connection directly from the set
of all monitor-segments' status in the network. Figure 3 shows an example to help understand this concept. If
connection c1 is the OAF , according to the truth table we can identify the status for both the monitor-segments
and connections, as show in Table 2. The monitor-segments can only identify the status of c2 and c3 as IF s,
while status of connection c1 as uncertain according to both monitor-segments' results, thus, c1 is UnIdentied
connection.
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Figure 3. UnIdentied connection
Table 2. Status of the connections and the monitor-segments shown in Figure 3
monitor-segments S(msc) S(c1) S(c2) S(c3)
S(1c2) A uncertain uncertain IF
S(3c3) A uncertain IF uncertain
3.2. Necessary and suÆcient condition
Lemma 1: In any network, if this system is one-OAF diagnosable, then the jUnIdentified connectionj  1.
PROOF: Obvious.
Lemma 2: For an arbitrary connection ci, if ci is UnIdentied, then S(msci) = A for 8 msci 2  
 1(ci).
PROOF: Suppose one msck 2  
 1(ci) has S(msck) = A. Then, according to Table 1, S(ci) = IF , and
this contradicts the condition.




then for this network with the connection set C, jUnIdentified connectionj  1 holds.
PROOF: (Necessity). Suppose   1(ci) =  
 1(cj), then there are two possibilities.
(1).   1(ci) =  
 1(cj) = . Then for all mscx 2 MSC, there always exists a non  monitoring relation
to both ci and cj . If for all mscx 2 MSC, S(mscx) = A, then according to Table 1, the status for both ci
and cj will be uncertain. All other connections will have a status of IF . Thus, these two connections will be
UnIdentied, and jUnIdentified connectionj > 1.
(2).   1(ci) =  
 1(cj) 6= . Figure 4(1) shows a network which has 3 nodes and two connections, ci and
cj . The only way to make  
 1(ci) =  
 1(cj) 6=  is to let node 1 and 3 be monitor nodes and node 2 be
non-monitor node, as shown in Figure 4(2). Figure 4(3) shows the monitor-segment graph G0. Suppose ci is
the OAF . Then both monitor-segments would have state A, which make both ci and cj in uncertain status.
Again, jUnIdentified connectionj > 1.
(SuÆciency). Suppose jUnIdentified connectionj > 1. Then, there are only three possibilities:
(1) at least 2 UnIdentied connections have   1(c) = . Arbitrarily pick a pair of connections ci and cj
from this UnIdentied connection set, and we get   1(ci) =  
 1(cj) = . Obviously, this contradicts our
condition.
(2) one UnIdentied connection ci has  
 1(ci) = , and at least another UnIdentied connection cj has
  1(cj) 6= . Then, according to Lemma 2, in graph G
0, there exists at least one edge (mscj ; cj) while
S(mscj) = A. Because of  
 1(ci) = , the monitor-segment mscj has non-monitoring on ci. According to
Table 1, if S(mscj) = A, then S(ci) = IF . Thus, ci is not UnIdentied. This contradicts the assumption.
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Figure 4. Two connections with the same   1(c) sets
(3) at least 2 UnIdentied connections have   1(c) 6= . Arbitrarily select two connections ci and cj from
this set. There are two possible cases:
Case I:   1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj). Suppose one monitor-segment msci 2  
 1(ci) but msci =2  
 1(cj). Then, edge
(msci; cj) does not exist in graph G
0. Thus, monitor-segment msci must have non-monitoring on cj . Because
ci is UnIdentied, according to lemma 2, S(msci) = A, which implies that S(cj) = IF , referring to Table 1.
Thus cj is not UnIdentied, this contradicts our assumption.
Case II:   1(ci) =  
 1(cj). This contradicts the condition.
Thus, if   1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), then jUnIdentified connectionj  1 always holds.
For a given monitor-segment msci, there are only two relations between msci and an arbitrary connection
cj : monitoring or non-monitoring. Let monitoring and non-monitoring relations be denoted by two values: 1
and 0, respectively. Then, a Relation Matrix R can be created as:
R =
0
@ r1(c1) : : : r1(cn): : : : : : : : :
rm(c1) : : : rm(cn)
1
A ;
where ri(cj) denotes the relation between msci and cj :
ri(cj) =

1; if msci monitor cj
0; if msci not monitor cj
:
Now, set two possible connection status, IF and uncertain, as 1 and 0, respectively. Similarly, set two
possible monitor-segment status, A and A, as 1 and 0, respectively. Then, according to truth table 1, we can
derive Si(cj) from S(msci) and ri(cj): Si(cj) = S(msci) ri(cj).












Y are 1 n vectors, xi and yi are their elements;
then, global status vector
  !












@ r1(c1) : : : r1(cn): : : : : : : : :
rm(c1) : : : rm(cn)
1
A :
The global status of connection cj can be obtained as:
Status of cj =

IF; if S(cj) > 0
UnIdentified; if S(cj) = 0
:
More details about relation matrix and global status vector can be found in.13
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4. A NEW SPARSE MONITORING POLICY
Previous section provides the necessary and suÆcient condition to one-OAF diagnosable network, but how to
place the monitors and setup test connections is still an open question. In this section, rst we will propose a
new sparse monitoring method, then we will prove that any network using such method is one-OAF diagnosable.
Before describing the detail, we need to introduce some denitions.
1. One-hop-distance monitor (OHM): If a monitor is connected directly to a non-monitor node, then this
monitor is an OHM to this non-monitor node.
2. Degree of a node: The degree of a node u is the number of links that intersect with u, denotes by D(u).
3. Pendant node: A node with degree one is called a pendant node.
4.1. Previous work: sparse monitor placement method I
In,13 one sparse monitor placement method is given as following:
1. Monitor placement policy
(a) for non-monitor node u, D(u)  2;
(b) for a non-monitor node u, it must have D(u) OHMs;
(c) for a node u with a pendant node as its neighbor, it must be a monitor node.
2. Test Connection Setup Policy
For a non-monitor node, if there is a normal connection terminating at this node, one test connection from
this node to each OHM is needed if no normal connection provides a monitor-segment on the corresponding
link.
3. Routing policy
(a) For any two of the normal connections (excluding test connection) originating from a same non-
monitor node, at least one must pass through three dierent nodes, including source and destination;
(b) normally we use the shortest path algorithm except for in the above case.
In,13 author proves this is a suÆcient condition for homowavelength crosstalk attack diagnose purpose. But,
with these policies, the number of monitor required is still pretty high. For example, in a 2-dimension mash
network topology, at least half nodes are required to be equipped of monitoring capability. In this paper, a new
sparse monitor placement policy is proposed.
4.2. New policies: sparse monitor placement method II
1. Monitor placement policy
for any non-monitor node u, it must have at least one OHM.
2. Test Connection Setup Policy
for any monitor or non-monitor node, if there is a normal connection passing through or terminating at
this node, one test connection from this node to each OHM (if exists) is needed if no normal connection
exists on the corresponding link.
3. Routing policy
(a) for any any arbitrary pair of connections ci and cj , if both source nodes are not monitor nodes, then,
U(ci) 6= U(cj) should be always satised;
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(b) for any arbitrary pair of connections ci and cj which share at least one node u, if both source nodes
are not monitor nodes, then, at least one of following condition should be satised:
i. u is a monitor node, or
ii. either UNN(u; ci) or UNN(u; cj) should be a monitor node, or
iii. at least one node v, v 2 U(ci) but v 62 U(cj), exists, such that DNN(v; U(ci)) 2M exists or one
of its OHM m 62 U(ci) exists.
(c) normally we use the shortest path algorithm except for in the above case.
Claim: With above new sparse monitoring policies, a network is one-OAF diagnosable.
Proof:
With a given network denoted by graph G(V;E), let M denote the set of monitor nodes, and let N denote
the set of non-monitor nodes, M  V , N  V , and M
S
N = V . Let C denote the set of connections in the
network. Let ci 2 C be a connection consisting of node fu0; u1; u2; : : : ; uk; : : :g. Let U(ci) denote the set of
nodes on connection ci's path.
First, in each link, we assume there is only one wavelength on each direction.
1. According to monitor placement policy, for a non-monitor node, at least one of its neighbor node should
be a monitor node, and according to test connection setup policy, for a non-monitor node, if there is a
connection passing through or terminating at this node, a monitor-segment between this node to each
of its OHMs should exist. Thus, for one connection c, at least one monitor-segment monitors it, i.e.,
  1(c) 6=  is satised 8c 2 C.
2. The necessary and suÆcient condition for an one-OAF diagnosable network is that any arbitrary pair of
connections, ci and cj , should satisfy  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj). Now, suppose there exist two connection ci and
cj such that  
 1(ci) =  
 1(cj). For any arbitrary pair of connections, only one of following possibilities
can be true.
(a) At least one of them originates from a monitor node. Without loss of generality, we assume that
ci originates from monitor m. According to monitor-segment property I, any connection originating
from a monitor can make a special monitor-segment that only monitors this connection. Thus,
a monitor-segment mci made by ci and m does not monitor other connections including cj , i.e.,
mci 2  
 1(ci), and mci =2  
 1(ci).  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), contradicts the assumption.
(b) None of these connections originates from a monitor node. Then, there are two possible cases.
i. U(ci)\U(cj) = , both connections do not share any nodes between them. Then, without loss of
generality, 9v 2 U(ci) but 62 U(cj), one monitor-segmentmsc(v!m) made by node v and one of its
OHMs m exists. Because msc(v!m) 2  
 1(ci) but 62  
 1(cj), which means  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj).
This contradicts with our assumption.
ii. U(ci)\U(cj) 6= . Assume u 2 (U(ci)\U(cj)). According to routing policy, only three scenarios
can be allowed:
A. Node u is a monitor node. Then, because u cannot be the source node for both connections,
either UNN(u; ci) or UNN(u; cj) must exist. Without loss of generality, assume UNN(u; ci)
exist. Then, monitor-segment msc(UNN(u;ci)!u), made by (UNN(u; ci) ! u) and monitor
node u, should be in   1(ci). Because there is only one wavelength on each direction,
UNN(u; ci) 6= UNN(u; cj). According to monitor-segment denition, msc(UNN(u;ci)!u) 62
  1(cj), which means  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), this contradicts with our assumption.
B. UNN(u; ci) orUNN(u; cj) is a monitor node. Without loss of generality, assume UNN(u; ci) 2
M exist. Then, because of same reason as above, UNN(u; ci) 6= UNN(u; cj), monitor-
segment msc(u!UNN(u;ci)) 2  
 1(cj) but 62  
 1(ci), which means  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), this
contradicts with our assumption.
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C. Node v is only in either U(ci) or U(cj) but not both. Without loss of generality, assume
v 2 U(ci). According to routing policy, either DNN(v; ci) 2M exists or one of its OHMm 62
U(ci) should be true. If DNN(v; ci) 2M exists, then, monitor-segment msc(v!DNN(v;ci)) 2
  1(ci), and since v 62 U(cj), according to monitor-segment denition, msc(v!DNN(v;ci)) 62
  1(cj), which means  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), this contradicts with our assumption. If one of v's
OHM m 62 U(ci) is true, then, monitor-segment msc(v!m) 2  
 1(ci). With same reason,
msc(v!m) 2  
 1(cj), which means  
 1(ci) 6=  
 1(cj), this contradicts with our assumption.
According to above analysis, we know that we cannot nd two connections in the network such that   1(ci) =
  1(cj) based on previous policies, with the assumption of one wavelength on one direction. Thus, under this
condition, the network is one-OAF diagnosable.
Next, we need to prove that a multi-wavelength network can be one-OAF diagnosable for each wavelength
if there is no wavelength converter.
Although there are multiple wavelengths in the whole network, according to our crosstalk attack model, the
crosstalk attack connection can only aect the same wavelength connections at the wavelength selective switches
(homowavelength feature). Therefore, a crosstalk attack on one wavelength does not have any chance to aect
the normal connections on other wavelengths. We have already showed that we can diagnose all connections
on one wavelength. Therefore, we can always detect OAFs on all wavelengths in the whole network, if there is
only one OAF on each wavelength.
In conclusion, as long as there is no more than one OAF on each wavelength and there is no wavelength
converter in whole network, we can always localize the OAFs based on our models and policies.
5. EXAMPLE
Figure 5 (1) depicts a 9-node bi-directional mesh network. According to sparse monitor placement policy, only
three monitor nodes are necessary in this network. Here, we choose nodes 4, 5, and 6 as the monitor nodes,
and the rest nodes as non-monitor nodes. By considering attack connection with homowavelength feature, to
simplify our example, we assume that only one wavelength is supported in this network.
: Monitor node
: Non−monitor node 
: Link
: Non−attack Connection 

















0     0     1     1
1     1     0     0
1     1     1     0
1     0     0     1
1     0     1     0
0     1     1     0
0     0     0     1
(2) Relation Matrix of monitor−segments and connections
Figure 5. Homowavelength crosstalk attack diagnosable network
Suppose we have some normal connections and only one of them is a OAF.
The current normal connection set is:
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Normal connection set = fc1(1! 2! 3! 6); c2(2! 1! 4! 5); c3(3! 2! 5! 6); c4(9! 6! 5!
4)g.
According to our test connection setup policy, no test connection is necessarily needed. Thus, current
monitor-segment set is: msc = f4c2; 4c4; 5c3; 5c4; 6c1; 6c3; 6c4g, and the relation matrix between these monitor-
segments and the connections is shown in Figure 5 (2).
Let us assume that connection fc1(1! 2! 3! 6)g is the OAF. Then, we can get the status of all monitor-
segments immediately: S(4c2) = A = 1, S(4c4) = A = 0, S(5c3) = A = 1, S(5c4) = A = 1, S(6c1) = A = 1,
S(6c3) = A = 0, and S(6c4) = A = 0. Thus,
     !
S(msc) can be obtained as:
     !
S(msc) = (S(4c2) S(4c4) S(5c3) S(5c4) S(6c1) S(6c3) S(6c4)) = (1 0 1 1 1 0 0).
Then, vector
  !













1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0





0 2 2 1

:
All values of S(c2), S(c3), and S(c4) are greater than 0, which means connections c2, c3, and c4 are all IF s,
while S(c1) = 0, which means that c1 is in UnIdentied status. Thus, the only UnIdentied connection c1 must
be OAF.
According to this example, we can draw the following conclusions.
1. Test connections will not utilize much resource in the network. According to our test connection setup policy,
a test connection is needed only if there is no monitor-segment on one link. If a test connection cannot be set
because no spare resource on a certain link, then the resource must be used by other connection, which can be
used as monitor-segment. Thus, test connections will not aect the network throughput.
2. This method is easily applied into a larger network. Suppose we have jM j monitors in the network, and
MaxfD(m)g = dM ;m 2 M , then the total number of monitor-segment will be no more than jM j  dM . Also,
assume there are total jCj connections in whole network, then the relation matrix size will be no more than
(jM j  dM ) jCj. Thus, for determining OAF, the computation complexity will be O((jM j  dM )
2  jCj), and
the only operations needed in computation are + and .
3. For a mesh network, sparse monitor placement method II needs less monitor nodes than method I does.
In this example, only 3 monitors are needed by method II, while at least 4 monitors are necessary by method
I. If this network is a 3  3 mesh-torus topology, then at least 6 monitors are required for method I, while
still 3 monitors are enough for method II. By considering the expensive price of the monitor device, this really
provides a big advantage.
4. If no wavelength converter is available in a w-wavelength network, two connections on dierent wavelength
cannot aect with each other. Thus, according to the proof in previous section, this network is w   OAF
diagnosable as long as there is at most one-OAF per wavelength.
6. CONCLUSION
It is important to detect and localize an attack connection quickly in a transparent AON. Quick detection
and localization of an attack source can avoid losing large amounts of data in an AON. However, detecting
attack sources is not necessarily the same as putting monitors on all nodes. In this paper, we prove a necessary
and suÆcient condition for one-OAF diagnosable network, and proposed a sparse monitoring method for such
network. The key ideas used in our solution are: (1) employing status of connections as diagnostic data, (2)
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placing a relatively small number of monitors on a selected set of nodes in a network is suÆcient to achieve the
required level of performance.
Specically, we focus on the homowavelength crosstalk attack and make the following contributions. (1)
We give the crosstalk attack model and monitor model. (2) Based on these models, we prove a necessary and
suÆcient condition for one-OAF diagnosable network. (3) We propose a new sparse monitor placement method.
(4) We prove that our policies is suÆcient condition to localize all crosstalk attacks, as long as there is no more
than one attack on each wavelength in the whole network. (5) We also calculate the computation complexity
of the method, and nd this method to be scalable.
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